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-2NATURE OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-Appellant appeals from an Order of Disrni& ., ,, '.:
on his Complaint asking for counsel fees under State Law i
services rendered in a habeas corus review in the Feder.
Courts involving impecunious prisoners.
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT

Utah
Cour

The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss Plaintili
Complaint and dismissed Plaintiff's Motion for a Summar
.Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmation of the Trial Court's decision.

titled
a COl
STATEMENT OF FACTS
pcrsc
Respondents agree with the statement of facts set forr COl

by the Appellant.

Utah

ARGUMENT

Utar
POINT I.
ALR
MINIMUM STANDARDS PROVIDED BY COUNT Com
FOR THE DEFENSE OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS D 2d 1
NOT INCLUDE THE APPOINTMENT OF ATTORNEY
BY THE FEDERAL COURTS.
The Defendants recognize the fact that every pefjC
charged with a crime in the State of Utah has the right tot
represented by counsel; that such a right has always exist1
in this State and is part of the Utah Constitution.
Art.I, Sec. 12, provides: "In criminal prosecutions tl
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in pel'i'
and by counsel . . ."

77-1-8 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, as amende

-c-3·t ,, '.c:

"In criminal pro:,erutiom, the rJdenJant is entitled:

()) To appear and defend in person and by counsel."
In the case of STATE v. ACKERS, Supreme Court of
Utah, December 5, 1935, 87 Utah 507; 51 P. 2d 1052, the
Court states:

41

irr

"That the constitutional right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel is a sacred right of one accused
of crime which may not be infringed or frittered away
and is one which may not be denied by the Court or be
waived by counsel, but defendant may by conduct or in
words waive such right."
The fact that every person charged with a crime is entitled to the right to be represented by counsel does not make
a county liable for the payment of attorneys for defending all
persons charged with a crime. See PARDEE v. SALT LAKE
COUNTY, Utah Supreme Court, September 22, 1911, 39
Utah 482, 118 P. 122.

RUCKINBROD v. MULLINS, Supreme Court of
Utah, January 19, 1943, 102 UTAH 548, 133 P. 2d 325, 144
A.LR 839; BEDFORD v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, Supreme
IT Court of Utah, November 13, 1968, 22 UTAH 2d 12, 447 P.
D 2d 193; and BENNETT v. DAVIS COUNTY, 1971, NO.
EY
11. The above cases held:

fjC

ot

Ci'

de

"The attorney, because of his position as Officer of the
Court can be compelled by the Court to render gratuitous service to the defense of, and an attorney who has
been so appointed is not entitled to compensation from
the public for his services in the absence of an enabling
statute. The reason is that an attorney being an Officer
of the Court, like other Officers takes his office cum
oncre and one of the burdens of office which custom
has recognized is the gratuitous service rendered to a
PO?r person at the sug,gestion of the Court. The constitut10nal guarantee of the right of an accused to be heard
by Counsel does not impose any liability on the part of
to pay an attorney assigned to represent the
md1gcnt. And the Courts have said that requiring an

-4.attorney to def end .an .accused -:vho cannot pay does not
mvolve an unconstitutional takmg of property without
compensation, or without due process of law."
Not until 1965 did the Utah State Legislature set up
any standards by which counsel representing indigent persons
accused of crime could be compensated for services rendered
to such clients. It is therefore, the position of Respondents
that before any county in the State of Utah can be forced to
compensate attorneys for representing indigent persons charged with a crime, the attorney seeking compensation must fall
squarely within the provisions of the statute passed by the
in 1965.
TITLE 77, CHAPTER 64, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, as amended, insofar as it affects this case provides:
Sec. 1 Minimum standards provided by county for de·
f ense of
defendants. - The legislature of the
State of Utah hereby declares the following to be minimum standards to be provided by each county for the
defense of def endanst who arc financially unable to ob·
tain an adequate defense in criminal cases in the
Courts and various administrative bodies of the
of Utah: (Emphasis added).
( 6) Include the taking of appeals and the prosecuting of
other remedies, before, or after a conviction, considered
by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice.
ARTICLE VIII, SECTION I, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, provides:
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in the
Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in the Supreme Court, in the District Courts, in the Justice of the
Peace, and such other Courts inferior to the Supreme
Court as may be established by law."
20 AM JUR 2d 395 SECTION 12

J

"The jurisdiction of Federal Courts is independent 0
that conferred by the states on their own courts,
cannot be effected by any
except of the Umted

-5Stites. Since the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Federal Constitution, nor prohibited by '..t
to the states are reserved to the states respectively, federal jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically provided
for by the Federal Constitution, Acts of Congress enacted
pursuant to that constitutional authority, and rulings of
the United States Supreme Court authoritatively construin,g t110se constitution and statutory provisions of the
Federal Government. In all other cases, state courts have
jurisdiction."

20 AM TUR 2d (00 SECTION 16
"The power or authority to create courts is an attribute
of soverei,gnty; it may be exercised by means of constitutional provisions or by statutory provisions that are not
unconstitutional ... "
STATE EX REL. A. C. BISHOP, ATTORNEY GENERAL, v. JAMES C. McNALLEY: Supreme Court of Utah,
February 4, 1896, 13 Utah 25, 43 P. 920
In this case the facts show that McNalley was appointed
the probate judge of Salt Lake City for a term of 2 years by
the President of the United States. Before McNalley's term
up, Utah was admitted to the Union. McNalley contended
th:i.t his term of office was for the full 2 years, the State
Uti.b contended his term ended when the Territory of Utah
becamr a 5tate. The Court held:
"The State of Utah is a sovereignty. That the terms of
the jud.e:es under the Territory expire with that Government. That their authority went with it. That the consit.uation of Utah manifests a general intent to dispense
with probate courts and gave the District Courts jurisdiction."
·
STATE v. DAVIS, 270 N C 1, 153 SE 2d 749
Attorneys appointed on November 10, 1959, to defend
an indigent accused of murder in the state courts petitioned
for an allowance for services rendered to their client in various
federal court proceedings which ultimately led to the client's
escc.pe from a death sentence imposed by the state courts. It

-6was stipulated that 110 order of a state court judge or federal
court judge had authorized their appearance on behalf of the
defendant in the UniteJ States courts. Under an applicable
North Carolina statute, the attorneys had been paid $1,700
for their services in the state courts. A North Carolina statute
effrctive on June 21, 1963, provided for the appointment of
counsel for indigent felony <lef1::ndants by superior court judges
and that the fees of counsel Lhus appointed were to be paid
by the state. Reversing an order compelling the state to pay
the attorneys for services rendered in the courts of the United
States, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
language of the state statute was clear and unambiguous, that
the statute provided for the payment of fees to lawyers only
in the state courts, and that no statute of North Carolina provided for the payment of fees to lawyers representing indigent
defendants in criminal cases in the United States courts.
Respondents acknowledge the North Carolina statute is
somewhat different than the one in Utah, and therefore produces it in full.

1963 SESSION LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH
CAROLINA.
CHAPTER 1080
AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT DEFENDANTS
CHARGED WITH FELONIES AND CERTAIN MISDEMEANORS.
The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact:
Section 1. G. S. 15-4.1 is hereby rewritten so that
the same shall hereafter read as follows :
"Sec. 15-4-1. Appointment of Counsel for
Defendants. When a defendant charged with a felony is
not represented by counsel, before he is required to
the .Judge of the Superior Court shall advise the defe%
dant that he is entitled to counsel. If the Judge fin
that the defendant is indigent and unable to employ coun·
sel, he shall appoint counsel for the defendant but the
defendant may waive the right to counsel in all case5
except a capital felony by a written waiver executed by

-7dcf rnclcnt, signed by the presiding .l udge and filed
record in the case. The .l udge may in his discretiov
an
defendant charged
a
appoint
misdemeanor if m the opm1011 of the .T udge such appointment is warranted unless the defendant executes a writteu
waiver of counsel as above specified. A defendant with
or without counsel may plead guilty but if the defendant
is without counsel, the .l udge shall inform the accused
of the nature of the charge and the possible consquences
of his plea, and as a condition of accepting the plea :>f
e;uilty the Tudge shall examine the defendant and shall
ascertain that the plea w2s freely, understandingly and
voluntarily made, without undue influence, compulsion
or duress, and without promise of leniency, but a defendant without counsel cannot plead guilty to an indictment,
charging a capital felony. Unless the Tudge determines
that the plea of guilty was so made, it shall no tbe accepted. In
of an appeal to the Supreme Court the
ludge shall appoint counsel for such appeal or continue
the services of counsel already appointed for the trial.
The Tudge shall appoint coumel as soon as possible and
practicable to the end that counsel so appointed mav
have adequate notice and sufficient time to prepare for
a defense."
When an appeal is taken under this Act the countv
shall make avaihblc trial transcript and records required
for an arkquate and effective appellate review.
Sec. 2. G. S. 15-5 is hereby rewritten so that the
arnr shall hereafter read as follows:
"Sec 1;,_5.
Allowed Counsel AssiP-ned to Indigent Defendant. Whenever an attorney is ·;_ppointed bv
the court to defend an indigent by the court which shall
be
and commensurate with the time consumed.
the nature of the case, the amount of fees usually charg·
ed for such casf's in the county or locality. The fee sa
allowed shall he entered as a jud,gment against the defendant, signed bv the court, and docketed in the jud,gmrnt docket in the office of the Clerk of the Superior
Court and shall constitute a lien as provided by the general law of the State pertaining to judgments. Any
hy reason of said judgment sh0ll be deposited
thr State Treasury. All costs
for the administration of this Section sln.11 be pa1d by the State of
North Carolina except re.gular and ordinary court costs
,k

in the

-8which shall be paid by the county as now provided b,,
law."
Sec. 3. The North Carolina State Bar Council sha!!
have authority to make rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act relating to the manner ana
method of assigning coumel, the practice of the Courto
with respect to determination of indigency, the waiver o!
counsel and related matters, the adoption and approval of
plans by any district Bar regarding the method of assign.
ment of counsel among the licensed attorneys of said
trcit and such other matters as shall provide for the pro.
tection of the Constitutional rights of all indigent persom
charged with crime and the reasonable allocation of responsibility for the c1efense of indigent defendants among
the licnsed attornevs of this State: Provided, however,
that no such rules and regulations shall become effective
until certified to and approved by the Supreme Courl
of North Carolina.
Sec. 4. There is hereby appropriated from the g-en- .
eral fund of the State of North Carolina, or from anv ·
other available funrls of the State, the sum of five huq·
dred thousand dollars ($500.000.00) for the fiscal year
ending Tune 30. J 964, and five hundred thousand dollar>
($500,000.00) for the frcal year ending June 30, 1955,
for the purpose of oavin": the fees, costs and expense'
provided for by this Act. All costs, fees, and expenses
be paid by voucher issued by the State Treasurer
according to the
for payment of debts due b·r
the State and supported bv order of the court.
(a) In all criminal cases in the Superior Courts of
State there shall be taxed ar,-ainst the defendant the sum
of four rlollars ($4.001 to be paid into the State
for the purpose of
in the appropriation reqmred
under this Act and ;-i_ sum of onF. dollar ($1.00) to be
taxed against each defcn::lant as aforesaid to be paid
the general fund of the county wherein the case is tned
to assist counties with the appropriations that will be re·
quired as the result of this Act.
.
(b) Any defennant making a false affirmation in
regard to the nuestion of indigence under this Act shall
be !!uilty of periurv and punishe<l as provided in G. 5·
14-209.
'h
Sec. 5. All laws an<l clause<; of laws in conflict wit
the provisions of this Act arc hereby repealed.
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be )n fu 1l force and effect from

:m 1 after its ratification.
Jn the General Assemblv read three times and ratified, th:s i21st day of June, 1963.

The Lcgis1<1t11re in setting the minimum standards

as

aforesaid,
referring only to tho:ce courts and administrati\C boclic; a•; prm·iclcd by tk
of the State of

Utah.
"POINT II
THE COURTS SHOULD NOT BROADEN OR EN-

LARGE THE STATUTE TO PROVIDE FOR THE PAYOF COUNSEL WHr.N !\PPOINTED BY THE
FEDERAL COURTS .
It is the RespnJcne position that the said statute should
be cow;tru•cd strictly, and in viewing the cases, it would
that the Courts are in agreement with that view.

HORTENCIO v. FILLIS, Supreme Court of Utah, Ocioln ?;i, 1
25 Utah 2d, 475 P. 2d 1011.
The Comt refme<l to enlarge the act to allow payment
of a'signcd coumel in misdemeanor cases. In this case the
C:o«!ft said :
"Jn 1965 the Utah Legislature provided for the assignment of counsel to represent indigent defendants and to
authorize the expenditure of public funds for that purpose. The terms of the legislative enactment limited its
purpose to those cases in which the penalty to be imposed
could exceed confinemem for more than six months in
jail or prison It woul<l seem that the Legislature did not
intend that public funds be used to pay assigned counse!
for indigent clcf r:n<lants in such misdemeanor cases.
"We must condude that although everyone accused <Jf
crime has a right to counsel, he does not have the constitutional ri.ght to counsel at public expense when charged
with a
in a city or justice of the peace
court. W f' arc of the opinion that it should be left to the
Legislature, H it so desire, lo expand the system of assigned counsel to misdemeanor
and to provide for

J

--10the expenditure of public funds for that purpose."
BEAL v. TURNER, Sureme Court of Utah, May !,
1969, 22 Utah 2d 418, 454 P. 2d 624.
The Court refused to extend the statute to include the
aprDintment of counsel for prisoners at hearings at which pris- ,
oner was required to plead to charges of violating his conditions of parole.
BEDFORD v. ::)ALT LAKE COUNTY, Supreme Court
of Utah, November 13, 1968, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P. 2d 193.
The Court refusd to exlend the provisions of said statute to include the appointment of counsel to represent alleged
insar1e persons in proceedings for involuntary hositalization.
UNITED STATES
CONN) 356 F 2d 216.

v.

THOMPSON

( 1965

CA 2

An attorney was appointed to represent a defendant on
Mav 10, 1965, but the bulk of
work, including preparatior.
of the briefs and arguing the appeal was done subsequently
to August 20, 1965, the date on which the Act took effect,
it was held that in administering funds appropriated by Congress the Court was not authorized to approve payments for
services rendered or for
of expenses unless ser·
vices were rendered or the expenses were incurred pursuant
to £Jn order on or after August 20, 1965.
Appellent states in his Point II that a reversal will not
set a bad or expensive precedent. That is not necessarily true.
It is to be noted that TITLE 18, 3006A U. S. C. A. was am·
ended in subsection ( g) to provide as follows:
"Discretionary appointments - any person subject to re·
vocation of parole, in custody as a material witness 01
seeking relief under Section 22.41, 2254, or 2255, Title 28
or Section 4245 of Title 18, may be furnished represen·
tation pursuant to the plan whenever the United States
Magistrate or the Court determines that the interest
of justice so requires and such person is financially un·

-11able to obtain representation. Payment for such representation may be as provided in Subsection ( d) and ( e).
However, subsection ( d) ( 2) of said amendment provides as follows : "... For representation in connection with a post-trial
motion made after the entry of iudgment or in a probation revocations proceeding or for representation provided under subsection ( g) the compensation shall not
exceed $250.00 for each attorney in each proceeding
i.n each court."
The Appellant states that he will be glad to submit a
lower figure. He is asking for more than four and one-half
timrs what the Federal Court presently allows. One must
wonder what other attorneys in similar circumstances would
do.
CONCLUSION
Neither the Constitution or Laws of the State of Utah
can be construed to provide for payment to Appellant for serYiccs performed in the Federal Courts under an appointment
ll\ a Federal Judge.
Respectfully submitted,
HARRY E. SNOW
Office and Post Office Address:
164 East Center St., P. 0. Box 520
Moab, Utah 84532
Attorney for Respondents

